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Human Capital Externalities:   








Investments in human capital are essential themes in many policy programs. Besides the direct 
private returns of education, there is evidence of positive human capital externalities at the level of 
regions and firms. Our results show that both production and consumption externalities have positive 
effects on wages. Production externalities are transmitted at the level of firms and not at the regional 
level. For workers in low skilled jobs, consumption externalities dominate production externalities. 
Workers on low skilled jobs earn higher wages when working in co-operation with workers in high 





























Many western countries, regions and cities increasingly deal with the issue of how to improve the 
economic position of their low skilled and low educated citizens. The OECD (2006: 24) argues there 
are three reasons behind this attention. First, many countries and regions experience skill gaps and 
shortages in specific industries: ‘...there is a strong pressure to upgrade the skills of low-qualified 
workers on the domestic market so that they can fill vacancies for more qualified jobs and fuel 
economic growth’. Second, the desire to increase productivity for many countries, because ‘…higher 
productivity improves the position of firms on the global market, attracts inward investment and 
sustains job creation’. Productivity growth also helps to sustain the current level of welfare, which is 
important with the rise in ageing in many countries (Broersma et al., 2014).  Third, there is concern 
about the ‘working poor’, a ‘…vast category of workers in low-paid employment involving harsh 
working conditions’. This is related to the goal to realize an inclusive labour market in which outsiders 
(low productive people), who are now unemployed or inactive, can participate and get access to jobs. 
This is related to the shares of low educated and low skilled employment in the economy.  
We address three themes that play a central role in today’s discussions about improving the economic 
position of workers with a low education or of workers on low skilled jobs. The first theme concerns 
the underlying mechanisms that Human Capital Externalities (HCEs) have on employment and 
wages. In economics, externalities are issues that affect other people who are not part of a specific 
economic exchange. In our case, these externalities are related to human capital and how different 
levels in human capital may influence each other in their joint output level. Economists have long 
recognized that interactions among workers may help augment human capital that determines 
employment, wages and hence individual productivity. Several previous studies, including Rauch 
(1993), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Moretti (2004a) and Liu (2007, 2013), have tested this 
hypothesis by estimating the effect of city or state average educational attainment on individual 
earnings. Combes et al. (2012) study the wage and skill distribution by employment density in over 
300 French employment areas. They find that both more high and more low skilled workers 
concentrate in dense areas rather than in less dense areas.  
Heuerman et al. (2010) conclude in their literature review that studies of HCEs are still far from 
reaching a consensus, or, as Psacharapolous et al. (2002: 4) mentioned, ‘…the results overall are 
inconclusive’. HCEs are the increases in total earnings resulting from a one-year increase in education 
(Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001). Besides the direct private returns for the individual, there is evidence 
of positive human capital externalities or positive social rates of return in regions and firms (Schlitte, 
2012). However, the exact nature of these externalities is unclear. Is it related to only a number of 
specific occupations of high or low skilled workers, as Wheeler (2001), Adamson et al. (2004) and Lee 
(2010) show, or is it related to the broader concept of creativity, as argued by Florida (2012, 2002)? Is 
it related to human capital of workers as argued by Lucas (1988), or to human capital of residents, as 
argued by Sassen (2001)? We will refer to this first type of social return, via workers, as production 
externality and the second type of returns, via residents, as consumption externality of human capital.  
In other words, production externality is defined here as the social rate of return on education of 
workers in a particular area. Workers in such an area benefit from a rise in education of an individual 
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worker, since all can learn from the higher education that this worker has acquired and they can all 
hence improve their output. To distinguish it from this production externality in an adequate way, we 
define consumption (as opposed to production) externality here as the social rate of return on 
education of inhabitants in a particular area1. It implies that when the level of education (or skills) of 
the inhabitants rises, their income is likely to increase and they are themselves thus more likely to hire 
persons with a lower education or a lower skill level to perform simple tasks on their behalf, like 
cleaning, maintenance and small repairs, gardening, shopping, baby-sitting and the like. In fact, this 
definition is close to what Acemoglu (1996) defines as pecuniary externality. This paper provides 
empirical evidence about the relative importance of these production and consumption externalities of 
human capital.  
The second theme points to today’s discussion on whether it is the education of the employee or the 
skill level of the job that determines economic progress. Education and skill are two different sides of 
the same medal. Education is a characteristic of a person and hence part of labour supply, while 
required skills are a characteristic of a job and hence part of labour demand2. Education and skill are 
not the same, as is simply illustrated in an increasing research literature on education or skill 
mismatch (Hamersma et al., 2013; OECD, 2012, 2011; Desjardins and Rubenson, 2011; Quintini, 
2011). Our purpose here is to assess whether the effects of HCEs differ when we look at either 
education or skill level.  
The third and final theme points to discussions about the level at which HCEs influence wages of low 
educated employees in general or specifically workers on low skilled jobs. Is it the regional level or the 
firm level that matters most as mechanism for transferring HCEs? Moreover, as far as the distribution 
of different workers or jobs is concerned, do low educated workers or workers on low skilled jobs 
benefit, in terms of  earning higher wages, from vicinity of many or of only a few high educated 
workers or workers on high skilled jobs? This distribution of education or skills within a region or firm 
is also a subject of our analysis. Basically it gives an indication of the possibility of co-operation 
between workers of different levels of education or the possibility of co-operation between (workers 
on) jobs of different levels of skill.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review of human capital externalities. 
Section 3 is about the methodology and data for The Netherlands that we use in our study. Section 4 
presents, discusses and interprets the estimation and test results and finally section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Human capital externalities: what mechanisms are at work? 
Without a doubt human capital investments through formal education are an essential theme in many 
national, regional and local public policy programs.  It is widely accepted that, at the individual level, 
                                                             
1 Note that this definition of consumption externality is not the same as externality through consumption amenities (like 
restaurants, theaters and so on). Nor does it refer to gains in individual utility that goes with large or skilled cities. The latter is 
sometimes referred to technological externality (Gleaser et al. (2001)). Instead, our definition merely serves as a clear (and kind 
of opposite) distinction from the more usual production externality. 




more education leads to a better economic position in terms of higher wages and lower probability of 
becoming unemployed (Heuerman et al., 2010, Moretti, 2004a, 2004b, 2012). The private internal 
rate of return to education is around 5-15%, i.e., an additional year of education of a worker leads to a 
5-15% increase in his or her wage rate. The existence of high rates of private returns to education 
provides an incentive for individuals to invest in education. However, the benefits of education may 
not be solely attributed to the individual, but may spill-over to others as well. So the gains to an 
individual investing in education (the private return) could also raise the returns to the economy as a 
whole (the social return). This justifies public support for education. The literature on social rates of 
return to education focuses on the often cited fact that high educated countries, regions or cities 
generate more employment and higher labour productivity than low educated areas, resulting in 
higher wages for all inhabitants of that country, region or city (Berry and Glaeser, 2005; Moretti, 
2004a, 2004b, 2012; Glaeser et al., 1995). 
HCEs reflect production externalities, in the sense that high educated workers increase the wage rate 
of other, lower educated, workers. More formally, production externalities raise these wages through a 
supply effect: extra employment for low educated workers is created because high educated workers 
share knowledge with low educated ones. Hence, when low educated workers interact with better-
educated ones, they become more productive and creative and can hence earn higher wages. There is a 
longstanding research line that is engaged in investigating these HCEs (see Lucas, 1988, and 
overviews in Heuerman et al. 2010, Psacharopolous et al., 2002; Moretti, 2010).  At the same time, 
HCEs may also reflect, what we call, consumption externalities; i.e., the spending power of high 
educated or high skilled inhabitants (not necessarily only workers) has a positive effect on the income 
of inhabitants with a lower education or on a lower skilled job (Sassen, 2001). Sassen argues that this 
‘consumption externality’ of educated individuals is oriented towards services often provided by 
individuals with a lower education or on a lower skilled job. Consumption externalities raise the 
income of these low educated through a demand effect: extra employment requiring low skills is 
created by demand from high educated individuals. The (wage) income of those low educated 
individuals will therefore rise.  As a result, production externalities typically occur at the employment 
location, whereas consumption externalities occur at the residential location. 
In addition, we have to determine whether there exists overlap between our definitions of production 
and consumption externalities. It is of course possible that a high educated worker, from whom a 
fellow (low educated) worker learns at the working location, will also hire (low educated) persons at 
his living location to perform certain tasks in and around the house, such as cleaning, gardening, 
shopping, baby-sitting and the like. Of course when someone lives in the same area where he or she 
works, that person can be present in both types of externalities. The question then is whether this is a 
problem of double counting or not. Both these types of externalities are distinguished separately and 
both have separate definitions, so the overlap of one person being in both types of externalities should 
not pose a problem as their definitions do not depend on each other. Moreover, even if this would be a 
problem, it still depends on the size of the regions we use. The smaller the surface, the larger 
commuting will be and for commuters there is no problem at all, since they have separate working and 
living areas to begin with. Of course now the actual size of the region is important. At the municipality 
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level, commuting is higher than at the (larger) regional NUTS-3 level. Still, commuting in The 
Netherlands is substantial even at NUTS-3, where about one third of the workers live in another 
region. At the municipality level even more than half of the workers commutes in from other 
municipalities where they live. Our regional demarcation in section 3 is based on 2-digit zip-code 
areas in the Netherlands, which amounts to 90 areas, that are somewhere in between municipalities 
(443) and NUTS-3 regions (40), so commuting will still be substantial and double counting in 
production and consumption externalities will not be a problem. 
Besides these two forms of externalities, we also have to define what we mean by human capital. The 
levels of education and skill are intrinsically the two major components of human capital. Education is 
a characteristic of a person and is related to the qualifications and knowledge acquired through formal 
education. Skill, on the other hand, is a requirement of a job and is related to competences and 
expertise, acquired through experience and training a person needs to possess to be able to fill that 
job. As is the case with investment in physical capital, investment in human capital will only be 
undertaken by a wealth maximizing individual or a profit maximizing firm, if the expected return to 
this investment (the so-called net internal rate of return) exceeds the market rate of interest (Blundell 
et al. 1999).  
Another interesting question is whether human capital spill-overs transmit between workers and 
firms. This relates to a large literature on the type of externalities that stimulate agglomeration, 
innovation and regional growth (for an overview: De Groot et al., 2009) whereby a distinction is made 
in Porter-externalities, i.e. proximity of workers or firms within the same industry, and Jacobs-
externalities, i.e. spill-over effects, as a result of proximity of firms in different industries. We have yet 
another approach. We focus on the spill-over effects on wage rates of individual workers from  the 
distribution of workers with different educational levels in the region, in the work location (firm) and 
in the residential location. 
Three important questions will be addressed in this paper. First, do production and consumption 
types of externalities exert an effect on the individual wage rate of workers and if so, which of these 
two externalities has the strongest effect? And how do these externalities affect especially the labour 
market position of the vulnerable group of low educated workers or workers on low skilled jobs? In 
that sense, do production externalities have an effect on the productivity, and thus the wage rate and 
hence income of low educated workers or of workers on low skilled jobs? Or do consumption 
externalities have an effect on the creation of low skilled jobs and hence the wage rate and income of 
low educated workers or workers who fulfil these low skilled jobs? Second, we will investigate the role 
of HCE at the firm level compared to the regional level on the wage rate of low educated workers and 
of workers on low skilled jobs.  The final question is whether the distribution of low and high educated 






3. Methodology and data  
We start from the simple Mincerian framework to assess the impact of educational attainment and a 
host of individual, firm-level and regional background variables on  the individual’s wage rate. The 
focus of this paper is on the effect of contextual factors, such as the education level of co-workers in 
the same firm and co-residents in the residential region of the worker, controlling for the education 
level of the individual worker, along with other individual, firm level and regional characteristics. This 
implies the following model specification 
   
 
 log(𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡) = 𝜶 + 𝑿𝒊,𝒋,𝒌,𝒕𝜷 + 𝒀𝒋,𝒌,𝒕𝜸 + 𝒁𝒌,𝒕𝜹 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡,      (1) 
  i =1,…, N, j = 1,…,J, k=1,…K 
 
where wi,f,r,t is the vector of the hourly wage rate for the i-th individual, working in the j-th firm that is 
located in the k-th region at time t. In fact we follow the description of the multilevel model (MLM) in 
Aslam and Corardo (2012). The intercept α represents the intercept term including fixed effects of 
industry, firm size and time. Inclusion of these fixed effects implies a model specification as if the 
variables of (1) are all centred with respect to these three items. The explanatory variables in matrix X 
all relate to each individual employee i that works in firm j, which is situated in region k at time t. 
Variables that enter X are the individual education level, individual work experience, gender and so 
on. Of each individual employee i, we also know the firm j  he or she works in and we know in which 
region k each firm j is located. Furthermore, we have information on variables Y that differ at the 
firm-level, but are similar for each individual employee working within that particular firm. One such 
variable is the firm level education, which is the average education level of all employees working 
within that firm. Finally, we also have information about variables Z that differ at the regional level, 
but are similar for each employee in each firm that is located within that particular region. Such 
variables are for example the regional worker education level, the regional inhabitant education level 
and regional unemployment.  
Note that region or firm-level fixed effects are not included, because in a repeated cross section, like 
the one we use, having a large amount of dummies (like worker, but even firm or regional level fixed 
effect dummies) means we end up with degrees of freedom problems. This is because for each year the 
data are based on different workers in possibly different firms in a different location. Another problem 
related to adding large amounts of dummies to the model is the fact that these dummies may also 
capture the effects of actual variables in Y and Z at firm and regional level, respectively, thereby 
making these variables redundant at the expense of a dummy variable, where the interpretation is 
much weaker. Finally, β, γ and δ represent vectors of constant parameters. 
Equation (1) distinguishes the effects of human capital to the individual wage rate at the individual, 
the firm and the regional level. In specification (1) we consider a multilevel regression of the wage rate 
for each i-th individual worker, working in the j-th firm that is located in the k-th region. Even though 
multilevel data structures also arise in longitudinal studies where an individual’s responses over time  
6 
 
are correlated with each other, our data set is not longitudinal. Instead, it can be regarded as a large 
cross section with three different levels of aggregation, the individual, firm and regional level,  hence a 
multilevel model. In order to be able to estimate a model with such a complex data structure, we apply 
the appropriate multilevel model (MLM) estimation method3. Multilevel models recognise the 
existence of such data hierarchies by allowing for residual components at each level in the hierarchy. 
In such cases multilevel models yield correct inferences, which standard OLS does not, and they are 
thus still  able to highlight the interest of specific groups. See also Snijders and Berkhof (2008). 
 
The data set we use to estimate model (1) is the Working Conditions Survey (WCS) from the Dutch 
Ministry of Social Affairs. This is an annual employer-employee matched data set covering 1995-2006.  
The WCS is a stratified survey among firms, in which a sample of employees working within each firm 
is also questioned. Each annual wave of the WCS comprises on average 37000 employees in about 
2000 firms. The WCS is not a panel in the sense that firms and workers can be followed through time. 
As was mentioned before, it comprises a repeated set of cross sections of firms and associated workers 
for each year, i.e. a repeated cross section. What this in fact means is that over the entire time period 
covered, our data set can be seen as one large cross-section of 368 thousand employees in 16 thousand 
firms. One of the variables determines the location of the firm, and thus the work location of the 
associated employees in terms of a 2-digit zip-code. These 2-digit zip-codes divide The Netherlands in 
90 areas, around the larger cities. This means that the number of observations N, J and K in equation 
(1) are N=368,500, J=16,000 and K=904. Since these zip-codes refer to the location of the firm, it 
helps us to identify possible production externalities taking place at the work location. Table 1 gives 
some descriptive statistics of our data set. The Appendix provides additional information on the data. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the WCS  
 Mean  St. dev. Min. Max 
Individual characteristics     
Gross hourly wage (euro’s) 12.36 5.88 1.59 87.47 
Education (years) 13,74 2,86 8 19 
Experience (years) 19,58 11,18 0 52 
Female 34%    
Part-time (less than 36 hours a week)  13%    
Firm characteristics     
Average education in firm (years) 13,36 1,95 8 19 
Regional characteristics     
Population density (population per km2) 1127 1194 104 5770 
Regional unemployment (share of unemployed in population 15-64) 0.054 0.021 0.015 0.144 
Human Capital Externalities (in years)     
Average education of the firm work location  13,65 0,76 10,43 16,57 
                                                             
3 We use Stata version 8 of 2013, which allows for estimation of multilevel models with maximum likelihood 
estimation. See Hox (1998) for more on multilevel modelling. 
4 We do mention that the actual number of observation on individuals N with which the model is estimated 
depends on the type of variables that enter the model, but generally amount to 368500. 
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Average education of regional work location, excl. firm of the worker 13,67 0,78 9,59 16,57 
Average education of regional residential location aged 15-64. 14.65 0.42 13.59 15.85 
 
The mainstream approach is to evaluate effects of human capital externalities to productivity growth 
in a production function set up, instead of considering its effect on wages. The wage rate a firm is able 
to pay does have a direct link to its productivity. The higher the productivity of a firm, the higher the 
wage rate this firm can afford to pay its employees. In that sense productivity and wages are 
connected. It is always very difficult to get a hold of adequate data that give both firm level 
productivity and worker level of variables, such as education or skill. The WCS data set we use does 
contain the wage rate paid to employees by the firm, but not the productivity of the firm itself from 
which this wage is paid. Nevertheless, these two are closely connected as we have seen. The sequel just 
considers the effects of various levels of explanatory variable on the individual wage rate. 
 
Educated and skilled labour 
In our analysis, we can relate years of formal education to the individual worker’s wage rate in 
equation (1)5. The indicators of human capital externalities (HCEs) are also based on the years of 
formal education. Education is therefore our key variable. We distinguish effects of education in (1), at 
the individual, at the firm and at the regional level. As mentioned before, these different levels imply a 
multilevel estimation procedure should be applied. Our model does distinguish different aggregation 
levels at which certain variables will be observed. First, for each individual employee, his years of 
education can be obtained from the WCS.6 Second, for each firm, the years of education of its 
employees can be obtained by averaging the years of education of its workers. Third, the years of 
education in the region (2-digit zip-code) in which the firm is located can be obtained in a similar way, 
i.e. by averaging the number of years of education of each firm located in the region from the WCS. 
Education at the work location implies a focus on HCEs in terms of production externalities. In order 
to distinguish between production and consumption externalities, we have calculated the average 
years of education of the population between 15 and 64 at their residential location in each of the 90 
2-digit zip-code areas of the Netherlands. These data are from Statistics Netherlands’ Labour Force 
Survey (LFS), which we have added to the WCS.7 This LFS is surveyed at the residential address and 
hence it measures the average education level at the place of living. This enables us to identify possible 
consumption externalities at the residential location, in contrast to production externalities that take 
place at the work location. Note that the number of years of education at the work location from the 
                                                             
5 Educational attainment is classified in low, medium and high education. Low educated are defined as persons whose highest 
educational attainment is primary (ISCED 0, 1) and secondary education, first stage (ISCED 2). Intermediately educated have at 
attained at least higher and post-secondary education (ISCED 3, 4). High educated attained at least education of a tertiary and  
above level. ISCED refers to the International Standard Classification of Education.  
6 The definition and calculation of variables is described in the Appendix. 
7 Average education level is available for all 443 municipalities existing in 2007 for the total period 1996-2007 from various 
issues of Statistics Netherlands’ Labour Force Survey (LFS). This municipal information is next rearranged to the same regional 
zip-code level as the one already used in the WCS.  
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WCS is slightly lower than that of the LFS at the residential location. This is due to the fact that certain 
industries are underrepresented in the WCS, like public administration and education, which causes a 
downward bias in the level of education in the WCS compared to the LFS. The LFS is a representative 
sample. It contains information on the education levels of the total population between 15 and 64 
living in each of the 2-digit zip-codes in the Netherlands. 
In the literature on skills it is common to equate a workers’ skill to her or his education (Bacolod et al, 
2009, 2010). However, education and skill are not the same. Although education is our key variable, 
we do take account of occupational skill-levels when interpreting the effect of HCEs on the rates of 
return on wages. The reason for this is that the group of low educated is not necessarily the same as 
the group occupying a low skilled job, because some low educated workers acquire additional 
competences allowing them to find a job at a higher skill level than their formal education allows. In 
fact, they are under-qualified for the job they fulfil. We distinguish between elementary, low, 
intermediately, high and scientifically skilled occupations.8  
Distribution of workers by education and skill 
The more high educated employees work together with low educated employees, the more likely it is 
that information spills over from these high to low educated workers. The same holds for the transfer 
of skills between workers on jobs of different skill levels. This means that low educated workers or 
workers on low skilled jobs may benefit when working next to high educated workers or workers on 
high skilled jobs. The WCS provides information per individual worker on the education level of that 
worker, as well as the skill level of the job that this worker fulfils. So, for each firm and each region we 
can identify the distribution of high and low educated workers and of workers on high and low skilled 
jobs. 
This distribution is defined as 𝑑 = (𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ), where  𝑒𝑘 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖,𝑘/𝑒𝑖∈𝑓  is the share of workers/jobs in 
firm f by education/skill level k, where k refers to either low or high educated workers or to low or 
high skilled jobs. The rationale behind this distribution measure is to assess whether firms specialise 
in either low educated or high educated workers, or in terms of jobs, specialise in either low skilled or 
in high skilled jobs, to achieve productivity growth and hence being able to pay higher wages. This can 
be exemplified by two well-known companies: is it a MacDonald’s-type of company, with many low 
skilled jobs (low educated workers) and just a few high educated or high skilled ones, or is it a 
Microsoft-type of company, with many high skilled jobs (high educated workers) and a few low 
educated or low skilled ones, where wages are affected positively. We specifically look at the wages of 
low educated workers or workers on low skilled jobs. The closer d is to zero, the more evenly workers 
of different skills or education are spread within a firm. A negative value of d means there are more 
high educated workers or workers on high skilled jobs in the firm than low educated workers or 
workers on low skilled jobs, i.e. a Microsoft type firm. A positive value of d, on the other hand, means 
                                                             
8 The skill types in the WCS stem from a specific classification used by the Ministry of Social Affairs, which we have converted 
into the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) of Statistics Netherlands. This SOC distinguishes occupations in 
elementary, low skilled, intermediately skilled, and high skilled and scientifically skilled.  
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more low skilled jobs (low educated workers) than high skilled (high educated) ones, so a 
MacDonald’s type firm. 
 
4. Results 
As a first step, we estimate model (1) to assess the impact of production and consumption externalities 
of human capital to the wage rate of all workers, irrespective of their levels of education or skill. Next, 
we split-up the production externalities in externalities at the firm level and at the regional level net of 
the firm. This shows whether production externalities are present at the firm or at the regional level.  
Table 2 presents the estimation results when equation (1) was applied to the WCS data base for the 
period 1995-2006 to which information was added about the average education level of the residents 
of age 15 through 64, at their place of residence. All model specifications of table 2 include 10 year 
dummies, implying that (1) is basically estimated as one large cross-section, as the dummies eliminate 
effects of time. Furthermore, all specifications include 15 industry dummies and 8 firm size dummies 
to account for industry and firm size effects. The typical variables commonly included in these types of 
Mincerian models, like experience and experience squared, show the expected sign and significance. 
The same holds for our finding that female workers have a lower hourly wage rates than average (and 
thus males). The fact that wages are higher in more densely populated areas and lower in areas with 
high unemployment is also in line with expectations and with results found in many other studies. 
Given our hierarchical multilevel method, the standard goodness of fit indicator, R2, cannot be 
calculated, so we have added the value of the LR-test relative to a standard linear model. These LR-
test values of the models of table 2 can mutually be compared in the sense that the lower the value of 
the LR-test, the better the model fits. 
Table 2 comprises five different specifications to identify the effects of HCEs of persons working or 
living in a region, i.e., a 2-digit zip-code area, on the individual wage rate. Table 2 shows estimated 
coefficients and associated z-statistics, which have the same function as the usual t-statistics but now 
follow a standard normal distribution. Columns 2 and 3 of table 2 show the model with solely 
production externalities.  We assume that besides the private returns to education for the worker, 
there is only regional production externality. The results imply that an extra year of education has a 
private rate of return of 7.8% on the individual wage. In fact, next to variables reflecting worker 
properties (like experience, gender and working time), this individual education level has the 
strongest effect on the individual wage rate in terms of the z-value. On top of this individual education 
effect, there is also a positive HCE of 0.3% from the average education of workers within the same 
region, i.e., 2-digit zip-code. In column 3, this zip-code education effect is split up into two parts. 
Firstly, a firm-level HCE effect, i.e., the level of education that other workers in the same firm have on 
the individual wage rate. Secondly, a regional HCE effect of the level of education of other workers in 
the same region (2-digit zip-code), excluding the firm. While column 2 of table 2 does show significant 
regional production externalities to the individual wage, in column 3 the regional production 
externalities are no longer significantly different from zero, but instead the now included firm-level 
externalities show up to be highly significant. This indicates that a worker does learn from other 
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workers inside the same firm, but not from other those working outside of the firm, but in the same 
region. An extra year of education of workers in the firm will raise the individual wage rate by 0.9% 
and thus the firm level production externality is larger than the regional level production externality of 
column 2 in table 2. Hence, knowledge transfer takes place on the work floor rather than in the region. 
Column 4 of table 2 shows the results of a model which includes only consumption externalities. An 
extra year in average education of the inhabitants in a region will raise the individual wage rate in that 
region by 1.6%. This can be interpreted as an extra demand effect of higher educated inhabitants living 
in the region consuming more personal low educated or low skilled services that leads to the creation 
of additional jobs. In column 5 of table 2 both production and consumption externalities enter the 
model and we find the effect of regional production externalities is significantly smaller than that of 
regional consumption externalities. Do note that the LR-test for this model is smaller than the one of 
column 2. This is because of the strong effect that firm level externalities have on the individual wage 
rate. The final column of table 2 presents the estimation results of the model with production 
externalities, being again split up in a firm level effect and a regional effect, and consumption 
externalities. The regional production externality net of the firm is, just like column 2, insignificantly 
different from zero, but the firm-level production externality still has a similar coefficient and still is 
strongly significant. The regional consumption is slightly lower but is also still significant. These 
findings of a fairly constant values of firm-level production and regional consumption externality in all 
model specifications of table 2 implies that these HCE effects are quite robust.  The size of the effect of 
production externality is slightly lower than that of the consumption externality. This final model of 
table 2 is preferred in terms of the lowest LR-test for goodness of fit compared to the LR tests for the 
other models.  
We do note that certain coefficient values of table 2 are extremely small. Therefore we also estimated a 
model based on the same variables net of their mean and a model with standardized variables, i.e. net 
of mean and divided by the standard deviation.9 Obviously the coefficient values change, but the 
associated z-values are very similar to the ones of table 2. Therefore we only report the estimations of 
the unadjusted variables of the model specifications in table 2, even though some may be 
small.Finally, the variables under the heading of ´variance components´ show how large the share of 
the total variance of the model is at which level of aggregation.  We can clearly conclude that most of 
the error variance is at the individual level, than the firm level and finally the least at the regional 
level.
                                                             
9 These estimation results are available upon request. 
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Table 2.Estimation results of equation (1) with maximum likelihood, multilevel mixed effects model estimation, 1995-2006  






















           
Individual worker level           
education level of individual 0.078 (482.8) 0.077 (451.7) 0.078 (484.1) 0.078 (482.8) 0.077 (451.7) 
experience  0.044 (341.5) 0.044 (341.7) 0.044 (341.5) 0.044 (341.5) 0.044 (341.7) 
experience  squared -7.1E-04 (-242.6) -7.1E-04 (242.9) -7.0E-04 (242.6) -7.0E-04 (-242.6) -7.1E-04 (-242.8) 
female -0.068 (-69.3) -0.068 (-69.9) -0.068 (-69.3) -0.068 (-69.3) -0.068 (-69.9) 
part-time 0.195 (99.1) 0.193 (98.5) 0.195 (99.2) 0.195 (99.1) 0.193 (98.5) 
           
Firm level           
average education of workers in firm   0.009 (18.3)     0.009 (18.3) 
           
Regional level           
average education of workers in region 0.003 (2.14)     0.003 (2.01)   
average education of workers in region excl.  firm   -8.7E-04 (-0.62)     -0.001 (-0.74) 
average education of inhabitants aged 15-64 in region     0.016 (2.54) 0.015 (2.39) 0.014 (2.24) 
regional population density  2.1E-05 (6.42) 2.1E-05 (6.48) 1.9E-05 (6.00) 1.8E-05 (5.68) 1.9E-05 (5.75) 
regional unemployment rate -0.512 (-4.39) -0.523 (-4.48) -0.521 (-4.55) -0.516 (-4.50) -0.526 (-4.57) 
           
Controls           
time dummies (10) 
industry dummies (15) 





















           
number of variables 38  39  38  39  40  
number of observations 368,541  368,439  368,541  368,541  368,439  
Goodness of fit 
















Variance components           
2-digit zip-codes 5.7E-04  5.8E-04  4.9E-04  4.8E-04  5.0E-04  
firm-level 0.015  0.015  0.015  0.015  0.014  
all residuals 0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  
The LR, or likelihood ratio, test rejects the null hypothesis if the value of this statistic is too small. The LR tests for the various models can be compared and the smaller the LR the better the fit. In that sense the  





Externalities for employees with low education and employees on elementary and low skilled jobs 
Table 3 shows the results for employees with a low education in columns 2 and 3 and the results for 
employees on an elementary or low skilled job are in columns 4 and 5. Columns 2 and 4 start with the 
same specification as the last column of table 2 and we will first discuss these results.  Next, we add 
the distribution of low and high educated workers and of workers on low and high skilled jobs. 
The private returns to education for workers with a low education and for workers on an elementary 
or low skilled job in table 3 is positive and about the same, with a rate of return of about 3.5%. So an 
additional year of education for workers with a low education or on a low skilled job will raise their 
wage rate with about 0.035. Note this is less than half the return we found for all employees regardless 
of education or skill in table 2. The coefficients for experience, experience squared, part-time work 
and population density are largely the same for low educated and low skilled and are also similar to 
what we found in table 2 for all employees. Next, we will discuss the differences between the models 
with all employees and of the low educated ones or the ones with an elementary or slow skilled job. 
Starting with the HCEs, we find interesting differences.  
The consumption externality of low educated workers living in the region is about the same as that for 
all employees as reported in table 2, but is only weakly different from zero, while this effect is much 
larger - and significant - for workers on elementary and low skilled jobs. In line with the findings of 
table 2, table 3 also shows no significant effect of production externality at the regional level net of the 
firm. So it is only at the firm level where an exchange of ideas and help in production between workers 
takes place and not in the region outside the firm.  Furthermore, such production externalities at the 
firm level turn out to be stronger for low educated workers than for workers on elementary and low 
skilled jobs. Compared to table 2 for all employees, we can also see that the coefficient values for 
production externality are about twice as large for low educated workers. For workers on elementary 
and low skilled jobs they are about 50% larger. So they profit more from a rise in education or skill at 
the firm level than all employees do.  
Table 3 also shows that inclusion of the distribution variable,  𝑑 = (𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ), has significant but 
opposite effects in the model of low educated workers compared to the one of workers on elementary 
and low skilled jobs. For low educated workers we find a positive coefficient for the distribution d of 
low minus high educated employees, whereas it is negative for the distribution of elementary and low 
minus high and scientific jobs. So as far as education of employees is concerned, firms specialising in 
high educated workers have d<0, so the wage rate for its low educated workers – table 3, column 3 – 
will fall. When instead firms have more low educated workers than high educated ones, d>0 so the 
wages for low educated workers will rise. Notice however that at the same time table 3 shows a 
remarkable change in the effect of production externalities. This implies that workers inside the firm 
benefit stronger from rise in education when d is added. So for firms with many high educated 
workers, this compensates for the lower effect that d has on the wage rate, and likewise but than the 
other way around for firms with many low educated workers. 
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Table 3. Estimation results of equation (1), of employees with a low education and  employees on elementary and low skilled jobs,   
 1995-2006 (t-statistics between brackets based on clustered standard errors) 
Dependent variable Log of hourly wage rate for    


















Individual worker level         
education level of individual 0.035 (82.4) 0.035 (81.2) 0.034 (96.3) 0.035 (97.9) 
experience  0.046 (297.2) 0.046 (297.2) 0.045 (264.2) 0.045 (264.5) 
experience  squared -7.4E-04 (-225.7) -7.4E-04 (-225.7) -7.5E-04 (-198.9) -7.5E-04 (199.2) 
female -0.051 (-40.6) -0.050 (-39.6) -0.014 (-10.1) -0.013 (-10.0) 
part-time 0.206 (92.6) 0.205 (92.1) 0.176 (76.8) 0.174 (76.0) 
         
Firm level         
average education of workers in firm 0.019 (28.7) 0.025 (27.9) 0.013 (17.7) 0.002 (1.62) 
         
Regional level         
average education of workers in region excl.  firm -0.001 (-0.79) -0.001 (-0.86) -0.003 (-1.61) -0.003 (-1.67) 
average education of inhabitants aged 15-64 in region 0.012 (1.87) 0.012 (1.98) 0.021 (3.48) 0.019 (3.03) 
regional population density  1.4E-05 (4.65) 1.5E-05 (4.93) 1.7E-05 (6.16) 1.6E-05 (5.97) 
regional unemployment rate -0.377 (-3.17) -0.392 (-3.26) -0.509 (-4.10) -0.470 (-3.77) 
         
Distribution at firm-level of         
low vs. high educated workers   0.040 (10.7)     
elementary plus low  vs. high plus scientifically skilled jobs       -0.073 (-17.4) 
         
Controls         
time dummies (10) 
industry dummies (15) 

















number of variables 40  41  40  41  
number of observations 188,532  188,532  131,773  131,773  
Goodness of fit         
LR test vs. linear regression 33357  33238  246992  24172  
Variance components         
2-digit zip-codes 3.5E-04  3.8E-04  2.4E-04  2.5E-04  
firm-level 0.013  0.013  0.015  0.015  
all residuals 0.034  0.034  0.033  0.033  




We should however be aware of the fact that the education level says nothing about the job 
requirements, which in fact determine the wages being paid by the firm. The current economic crisis 
lead many high educated workers to accept jobs of a lower skill level and so earn the – lower – wages 
that go with that type of job. It might therefore actually be better to consider the skill level of the job 
that a worker has, rather than his level of education. The last two columns of table 3 show the model 
for the wage rate of workers on jobs of an elementary and low skill level. The model in the fourth 
column of table 3 shows the similar model specification as in the last column of table 2, but now no 
longer for all workers, but only for those on elementary and low skilled jobs. The final column of table 
3 shows that inclusion of the distribution variable of elementary plus low skilled jobs minus high plus 
scientifically skilled ones, has a negative significant effect. This means that in firms that specialize in 
high skilled jobs (i.e. the Microsoft type of firm), the wage rate for their workers on elementary and 
low skilled jobs is higher. In other words, workers on low skilled jobs benefit from possible learning 
effects of workers on high skilled jobs and as a result they earn higher wages. Reversely, when a firm 
has more workers on elementary and low skilled jobs than on high and scientifically ones (i.e. the 
McDonald’s type of firm), this will exert a negative effect on the wage rate of elementary and low 
skilled jobs. Also not that in this case there is a similar kind of compensatory effect in the firm-level 
education on the wage of elementary and low skilled jobs. Whereas the third column shows a positive 
significant production externality of 1.3%, when d is added in the final column, it fell to a mere 0.2% 
and is no longer significantly different from zero. Clearly this effect is now in the distribution-variable 
of the final model. For firms who specialize in high educated workers, this leads to an additional 
increase in wages of those with low skilled jobs of 7.3%. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated three themes that play a central role in today’s discussions on how 
to improve the economic position of low educated workers or workers on low skilled jobs. First, we 
unravel the debate on human capital externalities (HCEs) and ask ourselves the question if 
consumption or production externalities occur and if so, which one of the two has the strongest 
effects. Our results show that an extra year of education has a very strong private rate of return of 
almost 8% on the individual wage rate. On top of that, employees in general benefit from HCEs, i.e. 
workers in a firm or region benefit from the average education level in their firm or region. These 
HCEs can be split-up in both production and consumption externalities of human capital and both 
have significant positive effects on the wages of individual employees, but the magnitude of the effect 
of regional consumption externalities is larger than the production externalities at the firm level.  
Second, when we take a closer look at the production externalities by making a distinction between 
externalities taking place at the regional level or at the firm level, it becomes clear that production 
externalities are only transmitted at the level of firms and not at the regional level. Clearly, for 
learning effects to take place, there needs to be some kind of vicinity on the work floor.     
Third, especially for workers on low skilled jobs it matters in which type of firm they work in order to 
benefit from externalities due to the presence of workers with high skilled jobs. It appears that the 
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distribution of workers on low and high skilled jobs within a firm has a negative wage-effect for low 
skilled workers when a firm has many workers on low skilled jobs and only a few on high skilled 
(MacDonald’s type of firm). In contrast to that, the distribution has a positive wage effect when a firm 
has many high skilled jobs and only a few low skilled ones (Microsoft type of firm). However, when 
instead we add the education distribution within a firm to the model for the low educated workers, we 
found the exact opposite. In other words, now a McDonald’s type of firm has a positive wage effect 
instead of the Microsoft type of firm. Do note however, that even though the education of workers and 
the skill level of jobs will largely coincide, many low educated workers try to get a higher skilled job 
when they can, but also high educated workers settle for less when times are bad. So there is a 
substantial difference between education and skill level. 
We find that a policy strategy with the aim of attracting high educated workers is beneficial for 
enhancing the labour market position of low skilled and low educated workers. The effect mainly takes 
place via consumption effects. So, investing in amenities that improve the residential attractiveness is 
a promising strategy. Stimulating production spill-overs via learning effects at the regional level does 
not work, because this mechanism works only at the firm level and is especially effective when 
workers on low skilled jobs in firms work together with many high skilled workers. So, from a learning 
point of view, aiming at higher productivity and wages of low skilled workers, attracting Microsoft 
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Appendix – Data sources and definitions 








Observations of  
firms 
10 Amsterdam1 14,76 16346 1131 
11 Amsterdam2, Volendam, Zwanenburg, Amstelveen 14,39 10823 596 
12 Hilversum, Laren, Huizen 14,06 2669 221 
13 Almere, Weesp 13,27 2346 181 
14 Bussum, Uithoorn, Purmerend 13,26 3674 395 
15 Zaandam, Wormerveer 13,22 3723 380 
16 Enkhuizen, Hoorn (NH) 13,24 2365 234 
17 Heerhugowaard, Schagen, Den Helder 13,47 2661 316 
18 Alkmaar 13,91 3055 260 
19 Castricum, Beverwijk, IJmuiden 13,54 3992 271 
20 Haarlem 14,33 3378 278 
21 Heemstede, Hoofddorp, Lisse 13,83 5261 365 
22 
Noordwijk (ZH), Katwijk (ZH), Wassenaar, Voorschoten, Leidschendam, 
Voorburg, Rijswijk (ZH) 
14,16 5756 465 
23 Leiden 14,24 4421 313 
24 Alphen aan den Rijn 12,93 2994 280 
25 Den Haag 14,76 7752 470 
26 Delft, Naaldwijk 13,74 5619 469 
27 Zoetermeer, Waddinxveen 14,17 3585 272 
28 Gouda 13,61 2701 238 
29 
Capelle aan den IJssel, Krimpen aan den IJssel, Alblasserdam, 
Ridderkerk 
13,35 7531 559 
30 Rotterdam 13,68 15230 933 
31 Schiedam, Vlaardingen, Maassluis, Hoogvliet 13,88 7925 470 
32 Spijkenisse, Hellevoetsluis, Middelharnis, Oud Beijerland 13,33 4020 411 
33 Dordrecht, Zwijndrecht, Papendrecht 13,38 6827 512 
34 IJsselstein, Nieuwegein, Woerden 14,12 6732 532 
35 Utrecht 14,79 9294 480 
36 Maarssen 13,76 2122 166 
37 Zeist, Bilthoven, Soest, Barneveld 14,07 5876 520 
38 Amersfoort, Harderwijk, Nijkerk(GLD) 13,69 7924 565 
39 Veenendaal, Doorn, Driebergen-Rijsenburg 13,74 5771 503 
40 Tiel 12,51 1390 100 
41 Culemborg, Leerdam 13,39 2502 152 
42 Gorinchem 13,43 2403 216 
43 Schouwen Duiveland, Walcheren 13,49 2414 192 
44 Noord and Zuid Beveland 13,41 1724 153 
45 Zeeuws Vlaanderen 13,35 2406 173 
46 Bergen op Zoom 12,93 2149 248 
47 Roosendaal 13,18 4436 382 
48 Breda 13,31 6289 454 
49 Oosterhout (NB) 13,03 2752 194 
50 Tilburg1 13,11 6203 415 
51 Tilburg2, Waalwijk 12,79 3847 296 
52 Den Bosch, Vught, Boxtel 13,55 8673 565 
53 Zaltbommel, Oss 13,46 3236 257 
54 Uden, Veghel 13,16 5351 407 
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55 Veldhoven, Valkenswaard 13,52 3595 277 
56 Eindhoven 14,24 7988 492 
57 Helmond, Deurne 13,65 4434 359 
58 Venray 13,60 2861 189 
59 Venlo 13,49 6523 422 
60 Weert, Roermond 13,39 6058 454 
61 Sittard, Geleen 13,88 5439 376 
62 Maastricht 14,01 4794 342 
63 Heerlen1 13,45 1462 145 
64 Heerlen2, Brunssum, Kerkrade 13,46 4304 318 
65 Nijmegen 13,72 4383 311 
66 Wijchen, Elst (GLD) 12,92 3173 303 
67 Wageningen, Ede (GLD) 14,10 3726 253 
68 Arnhem, Oosterbeek, Velp 14,34 5934 404 
69 Zevenaar, Dieren 13,43 3002 257 
70 Doetinchem 12,89 3126 287 
71 Winterswijk, Lichtenvoorde 13,35 2346 223 
72 Zutphen 13,36 3243 205 
73 Apeldoorn 13,61 5545 438 
74 Deventer, Nijverdal, Goor 13,72 6008 469 
75 Enschede, Hengelo (OV), Oldenzaal 14,03 6741 622 
76 Almelo, Vriezenveen 13,36 3033 242 
77 Dedemsvaart, Coevorden 12,51 2379 236 
78 Emmen 13,13 1787 169 
79 Hoogeveen, Meppel 12,81 3442 277 
80 Zwolle, Nunspeet 13,58 4633 293 
81 Raalte, Epe 13,10 1816 157 
82 Lelystad, Kampen 13,09 2816 242 
83 Emmeloord, Steenwijk 13,23 2073 203 
84 Gorredijk, Heerenveen 13,38 2089 232 
85 Joure 13,59 870 94 
86 Sneek 13,55 772 81 
87 Bolsward 12,81 691 73 
88 Franeker 13,21 711 88 
89 Leeuwarden1 13,80 2929 150 
90 Leeuwarden2 13,57 548 68 
91 Dokkum 12,83 896 76 
92 Drachten, Bergum 13,25 2916 212 
93 Roden 13,05 1004 88 
94 Assen 13,39 2423 219 
95 Stadskanaal 12,75 549 59 
96 Hoogezand, Veendam, Winschoten 13,40 2260 185 
97 Groningen1 14,16 3431 286 
98 Groningen2 13,34 462 33 





Definition of variables 
Years of Education 
The WCS education variable (v1014) distinguishes seven education levels, but does not specify the 
number of years of formal education. To calculate educational attainment expressed in education 
years, the following rules are applied: 8 years of education for employees who completed primary 
education (v1014=20); 12 years of education for employees who completed secondary general 
education (v1014=30), lower vocational education (v1014=31), or intermediate general education 
(v1014=40); 16 years of education for employees who completed intermediate vocational education 
(v1014=41); 18 years of education for employees who completed upper vocational education 
(v1014=50) and 18 or 19 years of education for employees who completed university education 
(v1014=60). 
The full primary school program is 8 years. The first year is not compulsory, but most children do 
participate in the first year. We take account of a major reform of the Dutch higher education system 
in 1982 (“twee fasen structuur”), in which the nominal duration of a university program was 
shortened from 5 to 4 years. For example, we assume that employees with a university degree and 
older than 42 in 2004 have attended a 5 year academic program, while employees with a university 
degree and not older than 42 in 2004 followed a 4 year academic program (cf. Webbink, 2007). For 
the calculation of the fraction of skilled workers we include persons with upper professional education 
(“hoger beroepsonderwijs”) and persons with university education (“wetenschappelijk onderwijs”). 
For the years of education of the employed labour force living in each of these 2-digit zip-codes, the 
same assumption is used, be it that the LFS only provides information at three levels of educational 
attainment: low, intermediate and high. For these two levels we have assumed 11, 14 and 18 years of 
education respectively. 
Experience 
Labor market experience is calculated as follows:  experience=age−education−4 
where education is the number of years of formal education, and it is assumed that children start 
education at the age of 4. 
Wages 
The hourly wage rate is determined from 
whour =v22a×12/v63a×52−v67a×v63a/5 
where v22a is the monthly wage, v63a is the number of hours worked per week, v67a is the number of 
holidays (“roostervrije dagen”). 
Part-time Work 
An employee is defined as a part-time worker if v63a/v66a<0.5, where v63a stands for the number of 





Sector 1 : Agriculture and fisheries 
Sector 2 : Mineral extraction 
Sector 3 : Industry 
Sector 4 : Energy- and water control companies 
Sector 5 : Construction 
Sector 6 : Reparation of consumer articles and trade 
Sector 7 : Hotels, restaurants, cafés 
Sector 8 : Transport, storage and communication 
Sector 9 : Financial institutions 
Sector 10 : Rental and business services 
Sector 11 : Public management, mandatory social insurances 
Sector 12 : Education 
Sector 13 : Health and social services 
Sector 14 : Culture, recreation and other services 
 
Cleaning the Data 
Persons with an age below 15 and above 65, and persons with experience below zero are dropped from 
the sample. Also, we dropped observations where the hourly wage is below 75% of the legal minimum 
wage or above 12 times the legal minimum wage. Minimum wages for employees under 23 are 
calculated as a percentage of the minimum wage for persons aged 23 and older, 
 
 
 
 
